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Abstract—Society typically shows conscientious objectors more deference than
civil disobedients, on the grounds that they appear more conscientious and less
strategically minded than the latter. Kimberley Brownlee challenges this standard
picture in Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience, where she
claims that civil disobedience is more conscientious than conscientious objection, in
virtue of its communicativeness. Brownlee conceives of conscientious conviction as
necessarily communicative, and distinguishes it from ‘conscience’—the set of
practical moral skills involved in adequately responding to complex situations. This
review article argues that Brownlee’s account of conviction is too narrow, as it
excludes many core beliefs which we would want to classify as convictions although
they violate one or more of the criteria of communicativeness, while her account of
conscience is incomplete, because it ignores some of the persistent obstacles for the
development of conscience produced by structural injustice. The article identifies
these obstacles and offers some strategies for protecting against them, namely,
vigilance, self-scrutiny, empathy and collaborative ambivalence.
Keywords: conscience, conviction, communication, civil disobedience, conscien-
tious objection
1. Introduction
‘A crime is a crime is a crime, it is not political’, stated then UK Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher in 1980, standing firm against the Irish republican prisoners
who had staged a hunger strike to protest against the British government’s
revocation of their POW-like Special Category Status.1 Underlying this stance
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1 Quoted in P O’Malley, Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair (Beacon Press
1990) 60.
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and that statement is the refusal, common among public officials, to distinguish
between ordinary criminal offending and conscientious practices such as civil
disobedience and conscientious objection. Yet civil disobedients and conscien-
tious objectors alike act from steadfast moral or political commitments, whereas
criminals do not and are typically narrowly self-interested.
Civil disobedients are sometimes treated well by police and courts. Here are
three examples involving the arrest, prosecution, and trial of environmental
activists who had resorted to civil disobedience. First, at a protest against the
Vermont Yankee nuclear plant in 2012, the police arrested 130 environmental
activists ‘calmly and without any confrontation, with obvious signs that
protesters and police had worked out the logistics beforehand’, according to
reporters.2 Second, a Massachusetts district attorney recently dropped the
criminal charges brought against two environmental activists who had blocked a
coal shipment.3 Third, 44 Vermonters who waged a sit-in in a Senator’s office in
protest of his support of the US Government’s policy of selling arms to
Nicaraguan contras were ultimately acquitted by a jury on a ‘necessity defence’.4
These cases of accommodation and perhaps even leniency by the state,
however, are the exception rather than the rule.5 Police often use law-
enforcement weapons such as batons and teargas against peaceful protesters
(most recently in Ferguson, MO). District attorneys rarely drop criminal
charges against civil disobedients; and judges generally make pre-trial deter-
minations that juries will not hear evidence of necessity in protest cases.6 Civil
disobedients are thus generally treated as common criminals by states’
governments, and sometimes even found to be more dangerous than
common criminals. The 1969 US Report of the Task Force on Law and Law
Enforcement to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence,
2 See eg W Ring, ‘Vermont Yankee Protest: 130 Demonstrators Arrested At Nuclear Plant’s Corporate
Headquarters’ Huffington Post (23 March 2012) <www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/23/vermont-yankee-protest_
n_1374451.html> accessed 1 October 2014.
3 See eg D Abel, ‘Bristol DA Drops Charges, Says Protesters were Right’ Boston Globe (8 September 2014)
<www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/09/08/activists-drops-charges-case-blocked-coal-shipment-power-plant/
sUpBpGxzxAz3E2Vr5RFQQM/story.html> accessed 1 October 2014.
4 See B Bradley and N Wasserman (eds), Por Amor Al Pueblo: Not Guilty! (Front Porch 1986). The jurors
found that the protesters undertook their illegal sit-in in last resort, after other means of protest had been
exhausted. Note, however, that this happened in 1984, five years before the US Ninth Circuit articulated the
evidentiary requirements that must be met before defendants may present the necessity defence to a jury. To wit,
the defendant must prove: ‘(1) that he was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) that he acted
to prevent imminent harm; (3) that he reasonably anticipated a causal relation between his conduct and the harm
to be avoided; and (4) that there were no other legal alternatives to violating the law’. United States v Aguilar 883
F 2d 662, 693 (9th Cir 1989). Even if the 44 Vermonters could have met the fourth prong of necessity, they
would likely have failed the other three.
5 For a discussion of the norms and practices that should guide the state’s response to civil disobedients, see
W Smith, Civil Disobedience and Deliberative Democracy (Routledge 2013) ch 5. William Smith articulates an
original ‘philosophy of accommodation’ focused on negotiation and dialogue with protest groups.
6 See n 4; JL Cavallaro, Jr, ‘The Demise of the Political Necessity Defense: Indirect Civil Disobedience and
United States v Schoon’ (1993) Cal L Rev 351; J A Cohan, ‘Civil Disobedience and the Necessity Defense’ (2007)
Pierce L Rev 111.
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for instance, vilified anti-war and civil rights protests as posing dangerous
threats to social order.7
In contrast, conscientious objectors benefit from some substantial protections
and are often exempt from complying with rules and orders that conflict with
their moral conscience. For instance, the German Constitution provides that ‘No
person shall be compelled against his conscience to render military service
involving the use of arms’.8 Most countries that provide reproductive healthcare
services such as contraception and abortion have enacted ‘conscience clauses’ to
grant healthcare professionals the right to conscientiously refuse to provide such
services.9 Forty-eight states in the US permit parents to refuse to immunise their
children for ‘nonmedical’ reasons, on the basis of religious belief; and twenty
states among those, including California, Texas, and Michigan, permit exemp-
tions based on nonreligious personal convictions.10 This kind of deference toward
conscientious objection is usually justified by appeal to the respect owed to
individuals’ conscientiousness and the recognition of the moral and psychic
burdens of complying with law that goes against one’s beliefs.
But if civil disobedience and conscientious objection are both conscientious
practices, why do they receive such a different treatment? Conscientious
objection tends to be seen as more conscientious than civil disobedience and its
psychic burdens as heavier, so that it is deemed to have an overall greater claim
to protection. Thus John Rawls contrasts civil disobedients, who are organised
into groups, with conscientious objectors, who typically act alone, and further
notes that unlike civil disobedients, who intend to address the majority through
their disobedient act, and think strategically about the best ways to commu-
nicate their message, the conscientious objector does not set out to engage with
others, and in fact hopes that the necessity to disobey will not arise.11 In these
ways, conscientious objection appears more modest or less ‘showy’ than civil
disobedience. The difference can be illustrated by the contrast between Martin
7 Law and Order Reconsidered; Report of the Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement to the National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, A staff report prepared by JS Campbell and JR Sahid per Executive Order
#11412 <http://archive.org/stream/laworderreconsid00camprich/laworderreconsid00camprich_djvu.txt> accessed
1 October 2014.
8 Article 4(3) of the German Constitution.
9 The use of conscientious objection in reproductive health care is prevalent, for instance, in Italy, Poland,
Slovakia, the US, Mexico, and South Africa. See eg C Zampas and X Andio´n-Iban˜ez, ‘Conscientious Objection
to Sexual And Reproductive Health Services: International Human Rights Standards and European Law And
Practice’ (2012) 19 Eur J Health Law 231; L Casas, ‘Invoking Conscientious Objection in Reproductive Health
Care: Evolving Issues in Peru, Mexico and Chile’ (2009) 17 Reprod Health Matters 78; VM Lema,
‘Conscientious Objection and Reproductive Health Service Delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2012) 16 Afr J
Reprod Health 15.
10 See N Berlinger, ‘Conscience Clauses, Health Care Providers, and Parents’ in M Crowley (ed), From Birth
to Death and Bench to Clinic: The Hastings Center Bioethics Briefing Book for Journalists, Policymakers, and Campaigns
(The Hastings Center 2008) 35–40.
11 Rawls defines conscientious refusal as ‘noncompliance with a more or less direct legal injunction or
administrative order’ and civil disobedience as ‘a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law
usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government’. J Rawls, A Theory
of Justice (revised edn, Harvard University Press 1999) 320, 323.
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Luther’s ‘here I stand, I can do no other’12 and Martin Luther King, Jr’s ‘how
can we bring Birmingham to her knees?’.13
In her rich and thought-provoking new book Conscience and Conviction: The
Case for Civil Disobedience,14 Kimberley Brownlee reverses the standard liberal
picture laid out above. She revisits the concept of ‘conscientiousness’ (or, as
Brownlee calls it in the book, ‘conviction’) to highlight the features that
make conscientious acts of disobedience worthy of protection, and argues
that civil disobedience is in fact more conscientious than conscientious
objection. Brownlee demonstrates this through a detailed analysis of the two
core concepts that give the book its title—conscience and conviction.
Brownlee elucidates the concept of ‘conviction’ in the first chapter.
‘Conviction’, also referred to as ‘conscientious conviction’ and ‘conscientious-
ness’, is a descriptive property that designates sincerely held, though possibly
erroneous, ‘communicative’ moral commitment. When we have a conscientious
conviction that something is wrong, on Brownlee’s view, we must (a) avoid the
conduct in question to the best extent that we are able; (b) judge such conduct
in others to be wrong as well; and we must be willing (c) to bear the risks of
honouring our conviction; as well as (d) to communicate the reasons that we
think justify our conviction to others. These four elements—consistency,
universality, non-evasion, and dialogue—form the core of the ‘communicative
principle of conscientiousness’.15
The second chapter conceives of the concept of ‘conscience’ as a normative
property that characterises ‘a set of practical moral skills that stem from an
inward knowledge of the workings of our own mind and heart.’16 Brownlee
situates conscience within a pluralistic moral framework, so that its function is
not to ‘give objectively right answers to moral questions,’ but it is instead to
‘help us to privilege certain values over others in light of our personal moral
situation’.17 Having conscience, on Brownlee’s account, involves being genu-
inely responsive to complex moral situations, that is, properly appreciative of
the legitimacy of the different values in play.
This brief overview of Brownlee’s analysis already hints toward what, in
Brownlee’s view, is wrong with the standard picture: first, civil disobedience,
insofar as it is essentially communicative, displays more conscientiousness than
12 ‘Hier stehe ich und kann nicht anders!’ Source: <www.luther.de/legenden/ws.html> accessed 1 October
2014.
13 Though not a direct quote, this question captures King’s reasoning at various points during the 1963
Birmingham Campaign, which included lunch counter sit-ins, store boycotts, marches and the famous
‘Children’s Crusade’. See eg ‘Birmingham Campaign (1963)’, King Institute Encyclopedia <http://mlk-kpp01.
stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_birmingham_campaign/> accessed 1 October 2014.
14 K Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience (OUP 2012) (hereinafter referred to
as Brownlee).
15 ibid 29–46.
16 ibid 52.
17 ibid 10.
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conscientious objection; second, the guide for moral action is conscience, not
conscientiousness. Let me briefly explain each point.
First, the ‘conviction argument’, as Brownlee calls it, challenges the idea that
private, non-communicative acts of conscientious objection are more ‘con-
scientious’ than suitably constrained, communicative acts of disobedience such
as civil disobedience. Civil disobedience, in her view, is a ‘deliberate breach of
law taken on the basis of steadfast personal commitment in order to
communicate our condemnation of a law or policy to a relevantly placed
audience’.18 Hence it is necessarily public and communicative, whereas
conscientious objection does not involve a deliberate breach of law and is not
necessarily communicative.19 Brownlee thus re-labels conscientious objection
‘personal disobedience’ in order to underscore the generally private nature of
its manifestation and eliminate the connotation of superior conscientiousness.
Since civil disobedience is an essentially communicative practice, it is more
conscientious—and thus more genuine—than personal disobedience, in
Brownlee’s view. Moreover, insofar as efforts to engage with others about
our deep commitments through open and constrained law-breaking are more
worthy of protection than private and evasive acts of disobedience, Brownlee
argues that civil disobedience deserves more protection than personal
disobedience does.
Second, we often confuse conscientious conviction and conscience, in part
because the concepts are cognates, but also because our convictions feel to us to
be animated by conscience. Yet Brownlee claims that these properties are
different: in her view, to repeat, conviction is a descriptive property of sincerely
held core moral beliefs that abide by the four-pronged principle of
communicativeness; and conscience is a normative property that characterises
the practical wisdom involved in adequately responding to complex situations.
Brownlee stresses that although conviction often motivates us to act, it does not
necessarily result in our acting morally, since our deep moral commitments
may be erroneous, misguided, or even unjustifiable. Instead, it is conscience,
with its apparatus of practical moral skills, that we ought to nurture. The
‘conscience argument’, elaborated in chapter 2 of the book, claims that
conscience (once we cultivate it to a sufficient degree) enables us to perceive
our moral responsibilities, ie the demands morality makes on us in virtue of our
moral roles, and to honour them.
Brownlee goes on to develop in the third chapter a series of arguments
designed to explain how and why formal expectations and moral responsi-
bilities conflict (the ‘gap thesis’), why we ought to adhere to our moral
responsibilities at the expense of the formal dictates of our office (the ‘moral
roles thesis’) and even at the expense of our all-things-considered moral duties
18 ibid 18.
19 ibid 27.
False Convictions and True Conscience 5
 by guest on February 11, 2015
http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
(the ‘priority of special responsibility thesis’), and what the implications are for
society (the ‘minimum moral burdens principle’).
In the fourth chapter, Brownlee discusses whether or not there is a moral
right to engage in personal and civil disobedience. She finds that conscience
generates a substantial moral right that protects our ability to honour our
special moral responsibilities, free from interference. In contradistinction,
conscientious conviction generates two limited moral rights: one to inner
control and free thought (the right is limited insofar as it does not protect us
from others’ interference with our attention); the other to conscientious action.
This latter right to conscientious action protects many acts of civil disobedience
in virtue of their communicativeness, but not generally acts of personal
disobedience, given their evasiveness. Although all these moral rights have a
bearing on how upholders of the law should operate, neither of them carries an
automatic presumption in favour of being established as legal right.
While chapters 1–4 are grouped under the heading ‘Morality’, the second
part of the book, comprised of chapters 5–8, focuses on ‘Law’. Chapters 5 and
6 argue in favour of two legal defences that are not currently available to civil
disobedients, but should be. The first one, which Brownlee calls the ‘demands-
of-conviction defence’, is an excusatory defence that is grounded in respect for
autonomy and recognition of the psychological costs of literal adherence with
law when it conflicts with our commitments. This defence tracks conscientious
moral conviction and is more available to public, communicative acts of civil
disobedience than it is to personal disobedience. The other is the necessity
defence, which already exists in the law, but is not generally accepted as a
defence for civil disobedients.20 Per Brownlee’s proposal, the necessity defence
is a justificatory defence that is grounded in recognition of the centrality of
non-contingent basic needs, and tracks conscience-driven, responsibility-
prioritising, morally responsive acts of civil disobedience.
Chapters 7 and 8 articulate a theory of punishment to accommodate the
foregoing account of civil disobedience. Chapter 7 defends, contra Anthony
Duff’s monistic communicative theory, a pluralistic communicative theory of
punishment that is sensitive to offenders’ communicative efforts.21 The eighth
and final chapter of the book argues, contra David Lefkowitz’s account of the
moral right to civil disobedience which includes a claim-right against
punishment but not against penalisation, that civil disobedients have a moral
right against punishment, penalisation, prevention, and formal or symbolic
censure.22 Though this right is not absolute, Brownlee suggests that the
reasons to respect it recommend a non-punitive restorative approach that
clearly distinguishes civil disobedients from ordinary offenders.
20 See nn 4 and 6.
21 See A Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (OUP 2001).
22 See D Lefkowitz, ‘On a Moral Right to Civil Disobedience’ (2007) 117 Ethics 202.
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Brownlee offers in the second part of the book an original and nuanced
approach to the treatment of civil disobedients inside and outside the
courtroom, that is not only rightly sensitive to offenders’ communicative
efforts, but also in natural accord with liberal societies’ professed respect for
individuals’ conscience. In this review, however, I shall mainly focus on the
concepts of conviction and conscience as they are articulated in the first two
chapters of the book. These concepts indeed provide the groundwork upon
which Brownlee builds her theory, so that the soundness of the conviction
argument depends on the correctness of Brownlee’s communicative conception
of conscientiousness, while the soundness of the conscience argument rests on
the accuracy of her characterisation of conscience. Given these concepts’
foundational status, it is especially important to submit them to scrutiny.
As I shall argue, however, the narrowness of one and the incompleteness of
the other threaten Brownlee’s arguments. In the next section, ‘Convictions’, I
show that Brownlee’s conception of conviction in terms of communicativeness
is problematically narrow because it excludes many core beliefs which we
would want to classify as conscientious convictions although they run afoul of
one or more of the conditions of the communicative principle. In section 3,
‘Conscience’, I argue that Brownlee’s account of conscience is incomplete and
propose to remedy its lacunae by identifying some of the persistent obstacles
for the cultivation of conscience, especially those produced by structural
injustice, and setting forth several strategies for developing conscience against
these obstacles.
2. Convictions
A. Communicativeness
We ordinarily understand conscientious conviction to refer to sincere, though
not necessarily communicative, core moral belief. Brownlee’s own definition of
conviction is at odds with this ordinary understanding, as she claims that the
marks of communicativeness—to repeat, consistency (we must align our beliefs
and actions with our conviction); universality (we must judge other people’s
conduct by our conviction’s lights); non-evasion (we must not evade the
potential costs of honouring our conviction); and dialogue (we must engage
with others about the reasons for our belief)—are ‘necessary and sufficient
conditions for conscientious conviction’.23 The analysis of conviction in terms
of communicativeness is central to the conviction argument, according to
which civil disobedience is more conscientious than personal disobedience.
Brownlee notes that the conviction argument is animated by ‘respect for
persons as reasoning and feeling beings who are capable of forming deep,
23 ibid 40.
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persistent moral commitments’.24 Given this broad concern for persons’ moral
capacities, it is surprising that she goes on to defend such a narrow conception
of conscientious conviction. Indeed we would intuitively classify as conscien-
tious convictions certain moral beliefs that violate the principle of
communicativeness.
Here are some examples. The left-wing political anarchist may both pay her
taxes and usually refrain to express or defend her views, because of the risks of
honouring her conviction, even in liberal societies (since, for instance, the US
Federal Bureau of Investigation designates anarchists as a domestic terrorism
threat).25 At the extreme, Soviet Russian dissidents could neither act
consistently with their convictions nor engage others about them on pain of
being sent to the gulag for ‘political rehabilitation’. A devout young Catholic
convinced that sex outside marriage is morally wrong might still engage in all
sorts of intimate physical contact short of coitus, in violation of the consistency
condition. A person raised in a very conservative environment might be evasive
and non-dialogic as she comes to shed her parents’ and peers’ views and
develops liberal conscientious convictions.26 Or again, a ‘pro-life’ supporter
may decline to pass judgment on women who underwent or plan to have an
abortion, thereby violating the universality requirement.
Of course, more would need to be said to establish conclusively that these
cases constitute strong counterexamples to Brownlee’s conception of conscien-
tiousness, but they should, at least, highlight its narrowness, and raise doubts
regarding the necessary and sufficient conditions for conviction. Her account
indeed seems to draw arbitrary lines amidst the wide array of conscientious
beliefs and to neglect the importance of assessing each conviction in its
particular milieu. Brownlee examines an impressive list of objections against
each component of the communicative principle, anticipating many issues that
my examples above purport to raise. However, I do not believe that her
responses, which boil down to an emphasis on the principle’s context-
sensitivity and its supposed malleability to diverse circumstances, lay to rest the
various concerns raised by my counterexamples.
Brownlee underscores the fact that the consistency condition is qualified by
the clause ‘to the best extent we are able’, which accommodates physical,
psychological, or circumstantial inability.27 She stresses that the non-evasion
condition ‘is of course broadly context sensitive’, and that we don’t have to
honour our beliefs at every single opportunity, or at the risk of offending our
24 ibid 17.
25 See US Department of Justice, ‘Today’s FBI: Facts and Figures 2013-2014’, 34 <http://www.fbi.gov/
stats-services/publications/todays-fbi-facts-figures/facts-and-figures-031413.pdf>.
26 Alon Harel critiques Brownlee’s conception of conscientious conviction along those lines in his recent
review of her book, as he argues that moral beliefs that one is busy reflecting upon and experimenting with are
often non-communicative in some ways because of their relative inchoateness. See A Harel, ‘Review of Kimberley
Brownlee’s Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience’ 2013.02.29 Notre Dame Philosophical
Reviews <http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/37833> accessed 24 December 2014.
27 Brownlee 31.
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friends and relatives.28 Brownlee also considers the objection, nestled in the
cases of the left-wing anarchist, the Russian dissident and the budding liberal,
that the dialogic condition can often involve significant personal costs,
especially for those who hold unpopular views or are disadvantaged in some
way.
In her responses to these objections, Brownlee notes the communicative
principle’s sensitivity to the ‘burdens of vulnerability, disadvantage,
unpopularity, relative power, and relative cost of communication’.29 She
denies that the dialogic condition demands we engage with others about our
conviction: instead, the condition ‘requires that we appreciate the reasons to
communicate our conviction and ceteris paribus that we intend to do so unless
the reasons to communicate are outweighed by undue costs of communicat-
ing’.30 If I understand Brownlee correctly, it is possible for a conviction to meet
the non-evasion and dialogic criteria of communicativeness without ever being
actually communicated, so long as the agent appreciates the reason to engage
with others but (reasonably) deems the costs of doing so excessively
burdensome.
This possibility raises two serious issues for Brownlee’s conception of
conscientiousness: first, it defeats the point of the communicativeness of
conscientious conviction, which is to guarantee that the sincerity of our
commitments be visible to all, and that no doubt be cast on it. If convictions
can bear the marks of conscientiousness without being communicated, then we
have to guess the agent’s degree of emotional and psychological investment in
his or her belief without relying on its external expression. This seems to
remove much of the force and point from Brownlee’s principle specifically as a
principle of communicativeness. Second, if under certain unfavourable condi-
tions, the criteria of communicativeness can be satisfied notwithstanding the
lack of de facto communication, then surely we are justified in wondering why
Brownlee claims they are necessary and sufficient conditions for conscien-
tiousness. Conceiving of the communicative principle’s conditions as merely
sufficient conditions or ceteris paribus constraints instead would better fit its
context-sensitivity.
B. Consistency
In this section, I shall further support my case against Brownlee’s conception of
conviction by focussing on the following precondition for consistency (and thus
for conscientiousness): convictions must meet certain logical and evidentiary
standards. As Brownlee explains, ‘this does not mean that convictions must be
correct, but it does mean that they must meet minimal standards of
28 ibid 37.
29 ibid 44.
30 ibid 43.
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intelligibility, internal coherence, and evidential satisfactoriness’.31 Without
minimal intelligibility, consistency, and responsiveness to evidence, Brownlee
claims, ‘there is no determinate answer to what the content of the conviction is,
and hence no way of assessing consistency, and no way of deciding whether
and how to be accommodating of it’.32 She later adds that irrational
convictions ‘cannot claim the degree of toleration that genuine conviction
can claim because they lack both the determinate content and reflection that
confirm our psychological and emotional investment’.33
Brownlee thereby seems to exclude from the category of conscientious
conviction a significant portion of religious beliefs—especially those based on
revelation and grounded in faith—insofar as their veracity to believers is not
grounded in, or responsive to, what we usually regard as evidence.34 This is
problematic given the prominent place of religion in people’s life and in their
conscientious convictions. It further appears wrong to correlate psychic
investment with reflection, when many revelation-based convictions are
characterised by a profound psychological and emotional investment that
does not necessarily result from reasoned reflection (indeed reflection could
either threaten or deepen this investment).
However, Brownlee denies that her account necessarily rules out revelation-
based convictions, noting that the consistency and dialogic conditions can be
met so long as the person gives (or can give) a reasoned defence of her view.35
Brownlee’s examples of beliefs that violate this precondition for consistency are
parents’ belief in healing their sick child through prayer alone and anti-abortion
activists’ beliefs that they ought to kill abortion providers.36 Brownlee does not
dwell on any borderline cases, nor does she provide any example of convictions
that some people might deem irrational although they do in fact meet minimal
standards of evidence. However, she elsewhere mentions refusal of vaccination
and opposition to emergency contraceptive pills in a way that implies that these
beliefs can be properly classified as convictions.37 Another example of
conviction that would certainly meet Brownlee’s consistency test is Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ refusal of blood transfusion.38
But why would the belief that one can heal diabetes through prayer or that
one ought to slay physicians who perform abortion violate minimal evidentiary
31 ibid 31.
32 ibid.
33 ibid 40.
34 For instance, Brian Leiter conceives of religious beliefs as categorical demands that ‘do not answer
ultimately (or at the limit) to evidence and reasons, as these are understood in other domains concerned with
knowledge of the world. Religious beliefs, in virtue of being based on ‘‘faith,’’ are insulated from ordinary
standards of evidence and rational justification, the ones we employ in both common sense and in science’. See
B Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton University Press 2012) p. 34.
35 Brownlee 44.
36 ibid 41.
37 ibid 28.
38 Brownlee tacitly agreed, in correspondence with me, that the beliefs mentioned here, though irrational to
some, may qualify as conscientious convictions.
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standards, when the beliefs that vaccines cause autism, that blood transfusions
amount to ‘eating blood’, and that contraception is akin to abortion would not?
Brownlee claims that the parents’ and anti-abortion activists’ beliefs are
irrational insofar as the parents would take their child to the hospital for a
broken bone, and the activists denigrate the life of the abortion provider at the
same time as they call for respecting the life of the unborn. Notwithstanding, I
fail to grasp any clear difference in consistency between all these beliefs.
On the one hand, none of those beliefs seems particularly responsive to
evidence: contraception—including in the form of the ‘morning-after’ pill—
does not cause an abortion; instead it either inhibits ovulation or interferes with
the fertilisation process. Sound scientific research has established that immun-
isation does not cause autism, and is not an unnecessary and harmful way for
big pharmaceutical companies to make profit, to take just two of the many
myths about child vaccines.39 On the other hand, the beliefs in prayer healing
and in killing abortion providers, like the other beliefs mentioned, seem
minimally intelligible, in the sense that it is possible to answer the question
what the content of the conviction in each case is, and even to defend it. Thus
the parent could appeal to the Scriptures and say that God is the only one who
can heal diseases, while the anti-abortion murderer could claim to be acting in
defence of the innocent babies who were killed and are about to be killed by
the physician.40
For these reasons, I doubt that there exists a firm yardstick to determine
which irrational and erroneous convictions satisfy Brownlee’s precondition for
consistency and which do not. However, this does not matter when it comes to
assessing claims for protections because there is a simple way of explaining why
beliefs in prayer healing and anti-abortion violence are not protected. It isn’t
because they lack in consistency; instead, it is because they inflict harm on
unwilling others (namely, the sick dependent who will die without medical
intervention and the healthcare provider targeted for murder).
Regardless of whether it meets certain minimal evidentiary standards, a
belief does not deserve any respect if it directly results in harming or
endangering others (or one might say that the imposition of harm or risk of
harm to unwilling others outweighs the conviction’s putative claim to protec-
tion). And so the pharmacist may refuse to fill a prescription for the Plan B
pill, but may not prevent the woman from obtaining the medication elsewhere
(eg by refusing to return her prescription). The Jehovah’s Witness may refuse a
39 See eg <http://parentsagainstmandatoryvaccines.wikispaces.com/> for some conspiracy theories about
vaccination, and the Australian government’s Myths and Realities: Responding to Arguments Against Vaccination: A
Guide for Providers (5th edn, Department of Health and Ageing 2013).
40 Brownlee reckons this latter possibility as she argues that anti-abortion activists’ appeal ‘to a third-party
defence for their violence . . . would make their position internally consistent and ceteris paribus minimally
evidentially satisfactory’. But she claims that ‘other anti-abortion activists would not be able to give such an
account, especially when their violence is indiscriminate, ex post, or motivated by vengeance’, 41. Again, I fail to
see what justifies Brownlee in drawing a line between violence that seeks to prevent future murders and ex post or
retributive violence for previous murders.
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life-saving blood transfusion for herself, but not for her child. Similarly, the
anti-immunisation parent may refuse a flu shot for himself, but should not be
exempt from vaccinating his child, given the risks it imposes on the child and
the disastrous cumulative effect on herd immunity, as the recent whooping
cough epidemic in California demonstrates.41
Note that on Brownlee’s view, lack of consistency is but one reason that
certain convictions fail to be conscientious and thus do not deserve protection.
They also lack conscientiousness when honouring them requires conduct that
violates others’ moral rights. Thus Brownlee would agree that the Jehovah’s
Witness parent does not deserve any protection, on the grounds that the
parent’s conduct violates her child’s right to adequate medical care. I am not
sure how she would treat the anti-vaccination parent given that it is less clear
whether the parent violates his child’s right to proper healthcare by refusing to
vaccinate. In any case, Brownlee makes it a defining feature of conscientious
conviction that it cannot require conduct that is at odds with respect for others,
while my point is that we can determine which moral beliefs are entitled to
protection without appealing to their conscientiousness or lack thereof.
In conclusion, there appear to be many examples of sincere moral beliefs that
violate some of the criteria of the communicative principle, and yet that we
have no good reason not to count among conscientious convictions. Brownlee
may appeal to the context-sensitivity of the principle to show why the alleged
counterexamples do not necessarily violate the standards of communicative-
ness, but the principle’s context-sensitivity raises issues of its own, as I argued
above. All in all, the foregoing discussion suggests that conscientiousness and
communicativeness are different properties that should not be equated.
Keeping this distinction in mind, I would argue that the reason why the
standard liberal picture is wrong is not that civil disobedience is more
conscientious than personal disobedience; it is that communicativeness, not
conscientiousness, is the crucial ground on which to base claims of protection.
From this perspective, the morally significant difference between civil
disobedients and conscientious objectors lies in the manner or form of their
disobedience—the public and communicative nature of their act—rather than
in the quality of the agents’ motivation (their conscientiousness).
3. Conscience
While people with a conscientious conviction take morality seriously, on
Brownlee’s view, those who have conscience are ‘genuinely, self-consciously
morally responsive’.42 Having conscience is crucial for fulfilling our moral
duties and responsibilities. However, acquiring the ‘set of practical moral skills
41 K Doheny, ‘Unraveling the Whooping Cough Epidemic’ WebMD.com <www.webmd.com/children/vaccines/
features/california-whooping-cough-epidemic> accessed 23 October 2014.
42 ibid 52.
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that stem from a deep understanding of the nature of our hearts and minds’ is
a difficult task.43 Many obstacles can obtrude our efforts:
As [Thomas] Hill notes, we can be distracted by prevailing social norms; we can be
given poor moral training as children; we can be subject to fears and prejudices or
inculcated into false ideologies; we can be emotionally fragile or threatened, all of
which can imitate or distort the guidance of conscience, especially if we have dulled it
by frequently disregarding it.44
Though this short passage nicely evokes the numerous factors that can warp
conscience, including culture, education, ideology, fear and neglect, Brownlee
does not characterise these factors any further, as she is mainly interested in
the kinds of errors that can occur when one tries to address a complex moral
situation.45 She offers an account of what can go wrong (we may fall prey to
cognitive, conative, and affective errors), but not of why things often go wrong,
when we try to follow the guidance of conscience. Brownlee’s account of the
scope for error is very useful in helping detect one’s and others’ conative,
cognitive and affective shortcomings in trying to act morally. But an account of
the obstacles that lead to these shortcomings is logically prior to and even more
important than a typology of possible errors. To cultivate conscience well, one
needs to know what to beware of.
This being so, I have two main aims in the remainder of this review. First, I
shall complement Brownlee’s account of conscience by analysing some of the
major obstacles to cultivating conscience. I will focus on those engendered by
structural injustice, given its pervasive presence in decent, liberal societies, and
examine in particular how erroneous convictions, when they are shaped by
injustice, interfere with the development of conscience. Second, I shall identify
some strategies for defusing the corrosive effects of injustice on one’s moral
capacities and for cultivating true conscience. In my view, one ought to exercise
vigilance, self-scrutiny and empathy in daily life; and one ought to deploy
constructive and collaborative ambivalence in the face of practical conflicts
between one’s commitments.
A. Injustice
I find the notion that the obstacles to developing conscience, which Hill and
Brownlee identify, can not only distort but also imitate the guidance of
conscience particularly interesting. Brownlee warns against the risks of
confusing actual moral conviction with both ‘asserted’ moral conviction and
‘morally acceptable’ conviction.46 But, in my view, we should add that people
are also very likely to believe they have conscience when all they have is a
43 ibid 2.
44 ibid 66, citing T Hill, Jr., Human Welfare and Moral Worth, Kantian Perspectives (OUP 2002) 284.
45 Brownlee 66–70.
46 ibid 40.
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conviction. The psychological and emotional investment that goes into
conviction indeed makes it hard to distinguish it from conscience, especially
from the first person perspective: conviction—true or false—imitates, and feels
animated by, conscience.
In this section, I shall argue that structural injustice significantly impedes the
development of conscience. Living under conditions of serious injustice can be
unbearable and agonising. But injustice sometimes renders itself almost
impalpable by convincing us that it is in fact necessary and justified—this is
indeed typical of structural injustice. In my understanding, the harms of
structural injustice consist in hindering some people’s capacities in virtue of
these individuals’ perceived membership in a social group (eg ethnic or sexual
minority). Under conditions of structural injustice, harms are produced
primarily as a result of the ‘normal’ interplay between institutions, processes,
and norms in society.47 These harms are therefore harder to notice than those
that result from the intentional actions of individuals.
While structural injustice diminishes some people’s capacities, it benefits
others through privilege. On Alison Bailey’s conception, privileges are
‘unearned assets conferred systematically’.48 They are unearned because the
members of the privileged group enjoy them as a result of sheer luck—the luck
of belonging to social groups with race, heterosexual, gender or class privilege.
One of the functions of privilege, according to Bailey, is to ‘structure the world
so that mechanisms of privilege are invisible—in the sense that they are
unexamined—to those who benefit from them’.49 Privilege thus breeds
blindness and blindness reinforces privilege, since being privileged is being
able (even encouraged) to fail to see the oppressive system and the privileges it
grants.
Privileged persons are prone to deceive themselves into thinking that they
deserve their status and benefits, that they earned their gains through personal
talent and effort. As privilege is invisible to the privileged person, so is
oppression in general invisible to him or her (and sometimes to the oppressed
themselves): the unjust situation of those who occupy a subordinated position
47 See eg M Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (The Crossing Press 1983) ch 1; IM Young,
Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press 1990) ch 2. This broad conception of structural
injustice accommodates various types of oppression. For instance, some scholars and lawyers claim that the
normal workings of the US criminal justice system, with its draconian drug laws and pervasive racial profiling,
lead to a ‘New Jim Crow’, with prison inmates disproportionately black and brown, in spite of near-identical rates
of drug use and sale between whites and non-whites. See eg M Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration
in the Age of Color Blindness (The New Press 2010). For a different example, Ann Cudd argues that by choosing
to stay out of the labour market because of certain prejudices and economic forces of oppression, women in
contemporary Western societies perpetuate the current sexual division of labour and wage gap. She dubs this
phenomenon ‘oppression by choice’, since the harms of oppression come about to some degree through
oppressed persons’ choices. A Cudd, Analysing Oppression (OUP 2012) 146–53.
48 A Bailey, ‘Privilege: Expanding on Marilyn Frye’s Oppression’ (1998) 29 J Soc Phil 110. Bailey’s definition
is stipulative, distinct from the legal concept of privilege as ‘legal benefit that is not a right’. The advantages she is
interested in are the flipside of the harms of structural injustice (which are also systemic and unjustified). I use
the term ‘privilege’ in Bailey’s sense.
49 ibid 112.
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in the structure remains unseen as long as the privileges of the dominant group
appear deserved. The privileged often lack basic understanding of the
experience of deprivation and oppression, as well as the motivation to learn
about it.
The Marxist notions of ‘ideology’ and ‘false consciousness’ further help
explain how decent people can deny the existence of structural injustice
without necessarily being credulous or ill willed. Ideology (understood here as
a widely shared worldview that stabilises the socio-political conditions by
representing them as just), and its arsenal of stereotypes and biases, assure that
structural injustice remains concealed by providing a simple, alternative
explanation for the disparities (often backed by appeals to race or gender
essentialism). For instance, the stereotypical representation of blacks as drug
users and criminals is taken to explain the disproportionate number of African
Americans behind bars, thereby concealing the racist aspects of policy, law
enforcement and criminal justice.50
Ideology in turn produces false consciousness. According to Tommie Shelby,
‘to hold a belief with a false consciousness is to hold it while being ignorant of,
or self-deceived about, the real motives for why one holds it’.51 The individual
who suffers from a false consciousness believes that she accepts a belief solely
because it is epistemically justified, when in reality noncognitive motives
influence her belief without her awareness. Shelby gives the following examples
of noncognitive motives for embracing certain beliefs:
Though presumably we do not do so consciously, we sometimes believe things
because to do so would, say, bolster our self-esteem, give us consolation, lessen
anxiety, reduce cognitive dissonance, increase our self-confidence, provide cathartic
relief, give us hope, or silence a guilty conscience. When these and other noncognitive
motives are psychologically operative, we easily fall into epistemic error.52
So not only are members of the privileged group encouraged to think that they
earned their higher status, but members of the subordinated group, too, can
find (unconscious) solace in the dominant ideology, for instance by believing
that it is up to them to ‘make it’ to the top in a capitalist society. Denying
structural injustice with a false consciousness can also serve as an anxiolytic
against the discomforting feeling that one ought, but is not willing, to fulfil
one’s responsibilities in the face of injustice.
Structural injustice thus corrodes our moral capacities in the following respects:
the dominant ideology, buttressed by stereotypes, infects us with bias and obstructs
our reading of social reality and of our own and others’ conduct. It even damages
50 See Alexander (n 47).
51 T Shelby, ‘Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory’ (2003) 34 The Philosophical Forum 170. Shelby
notes that both true and false beliefs can be held with a false consciousness, so that detecting false consciousness
is not sufficient for rejecting a form of social consciousness, but further requires showing the illusory content of
that form of consciousness.
52 ibid 172.
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our rational capacities, as Carol Hay has recently argued.53 By encouraging self-
deceit, privilege and false consciousness further hinder the ‘understanding of the
nature of our hearts and minds’ from which conscience stems.54 Conscience
requires ‘the cultivation of practical wisdom, generosity, attention, thoughtfulness,
and compassion’,55 all of which are thwarted in some ways by structural injustice:
one cannot develop practical wisdom, attention and thoughtfulness, unless one is
aware of society’s workings and sensitive to the moral quality of one’s own and
others’ conduct; and moral blindness typically restricts generosity and compassion
to members of our own group.
Structural injustice’s most enduring influence is through education, as
parents and educators inculcate prejudices into children and shape their moral
capacities and emotions. But it is also important to see how it is perpetuated
through culture, and insinuates itself into people’s convictions. Under
conditions of structural injustice, erroneous beliefs and convictions that align
with the dominant ideology proliferate. Some of these convictions demand
conformity (eg for the staunch American patriot who believes his primary
moral duty is to obey the state), while others condone noncompliance with the
law (for instance, workplace discrimination against women is legitimised by
sexist convictions) as well as departure from the formal dictates of one’s office
(think of southern states’ officials’ systematic failures to enforce the law under
Jim Crow, in the context of white supremacist norms56).
These convictions spawned by injustice not only distort, but also imitate
conscience, insofar as they promote a certain reading of social and moral
reality, if a mistaken one, as well as a set of practical moral skills and virtues
(such as assertiveness and self-reliance in a capitalist society). Moreover, we are
likely to mistake these convictions for true conscience since they accord with
others’ and animate our cognitive and motivational responsiveness to complex
moral situations (as conscience is supposed to do). Hence false convictions that
result from prevailing, unjust social norms are both the virus through which
injustice preserves and conceals itself and a great obstacle to cultivating
conscience.
B. Strategies
Even if, as I argued above, false convictions contribute to damaging our moral
capacities and perpetuating injustice, there are good reasons to think that
53 Hay offers a Kantian account of duties to oneself to resist one’s oppression, which is based on the
recognition of the fundamental value of our rational nature and of oppression’s damaging effects on our rational
and agential capacities. See C Hay, Kantian, Liberalism, and Feminism: Resisting Oppression (Palgrave Macmillan
2013).
54 Brownlee 2.
55 ibid.
56 See eg CV Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (first published 1955, OUP 2001).
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conscientiousness is a potential antidote to the corrosive effects of injustice and
thus an ally of conscience. Brownlee herself considers conviction a necessary
‘precondition for integrity and conscience’, though she does not say why.57
Moreover, conviction seems apt to provide protection against the toxic effects
of injustice since our non-evasive and dialogic efforts should lead us to be
confronted with evidence at odds with our beliefs or even with a critique of the
noncognitive motives that shaped them. In this way, communicativeness may
be thought to expose us to exactly the kind of scrutiny that will weed out
erroneous beliefs.
However, there are certain reasons to doubt this effect of communicative-
ness. First of all, people tend to associate with people like themselves, who
have similar worldviews, making the chances that one’s erroneous convictions
will be critiqued in a dialogic setting actually quite low. Scholars have argued
that this effect—surrounding ourselves with like-minded people who will
confirm our convictions—is amplified online as a result of Google’s
‘personalised’ searches, whereby ‘Google directs you to material that is most
likely to reinforce your own worldview, ideology, and assumptions’.58 Besides,
as I mentioned above, one’s erroneous convictions are likely to be shared by
much of society under conditions of structural injustice anyway. Finally, as
Shelby notes, ‘[i]t is a salient fact about certain illusory forms of consciousness
that those who hold them often continue to be under their spell even after they
have been subjected to a number of telling, sometimes devastating, criti-
cisms’.59 Resistance to ideology critique is the default position for convictions
shaped by injustice and held with a false consciousness.
For all these reasons, we should be cautious about the potential of
conscientiousness to remedy the corrosive effects of injustice. Instead, as I
will now argue, we ought to cultivate a set of attitudes as we try to respond to
complex moral situations: vigilance, self-scrutiny, empathy, and collaborative
ambivalence.
First, we have a responsibility to do our best to see things as they actually
are, which includes a responsibility to seek out information. Becoming aware of
structural injustice requires acute awareness to one’s surroundings, which is
difficult given the common failure to question the existing arrangements.
Critical thinking is crucial to the task, including questioning tradition and
prevalent beliefs. Different venues may promote this type of scrutiny, including
57 Brownlee 42 n 40. Brownlee cites Matthew Pianalto’s arguments as to why ‘discourse’ is a crucial feature of
‘responsible moral conviction’ from M Pianalto, ‘Moral Conviction’ (2011) 28 J App Phil 381. But the
arguments she sets forth in this footnote don’t warrant the claim that conviction is a precondition for conscience.
58 S Halpern, ‘Mind Control & the Internet’ The New York Review of Books (23 June 2011), reviewing E
Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You (Penguin 2011).
59 Shelby (n 51) 171.
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interactive environments such as campuses and community centres, conscious-
ness-raising workshops, and diversity and inclusion projects.60
Second, we have a general responsibility to resist self-deception. Recall
Shelby’s explanation of false consciousness:
We sometimes believe things because to do so would, say, bolster our self-esteem, give
us consolation, lessen anxiety, reduce cognitive dissonance, increase our self-
confidence, provide cathartic relief, give us hope, or silence a guilty conscience.61
Avoiding the influence of the variety of noncognitive motives that can lead us
into false consciousness involves self-scrutinising and resisting self-centeredness,
resentment, deception and self-pity. The task is arduous, and requires keen
perception and courage.62
Third, we must do our best to understand other people. The right kind of
understanding involves empathy and care, and really learning about the
experience of one another. Laurence Thomas argues in particular that the
privileged must listen to the oppressed with a certain attitude he calls ‘moral
deference’ and which involves openness and attentiveness.63 According to
Elizabeth Spelman, the privileged must exercise their imaginative capacities to
put themselves in the shoes of the oppressed.64 Imaginative self-projection,
empathy, and self-awareness are thus required for proper moral learning.65
Erroneous convictions that are spawned by injustice get in the way of all
three attitudes: they hinder accurate perception of social reality, breed self-
deception, and block the paths of proper moral learning. However, the
attitudinal responsibilities I advocate above counsel vigilance toward one’s
cherished, deeply held convictions, since they may turn out to be nothing but
entrenched biases. Hence these attitudes may be the real or most important
preconditions for conscience and integrity. Someone who does not even try to
cultivate them may be blamed for his or her failure. According to John
Draeger, for instance, indifference and failure to care about victims of
oppression are morally blameworthy, as they amount to denying the victims’
basic moral worth as human beings.66
A fourth attitude is conducive to cultivating conscience in cases of practical
conflicts between commitments. Brownlee broaches such conflicts within her
discussion of the consistency condition. She suggests a ‘context-sensitive
60 See eg The National SEED Project on Inclusive CurriculumSM <www.nationalseedproject.org/about-us>.
SEED (Seeking Educational Equity & Diversity) aims to create ‘gender fair, multiculturally equitable,
socioeconomically aware, and globally informed education’ by engaging educators, parents, and community
leaders. It is the nation’s largest peer-led leadership development project.
61 Shelby (n 51).
62 See eg A Garrett, ‘Courage, Political Resistance, and Self-Deceit’ (2010) 90 BU L Rev 1771.
63 LM Thomas, ‘Moral Deference’ in C Willet (ed), Theorizing Multiculturalism (Blackwell 1998) 359–81.
64 EV Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Beacon Press 1988) 179.
65 See SL Bartky, Sympathy and Solidarity and Other Essays (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); J Harvey, ‘Moral
Solidarity and Empathetic Understanding’ (2007) 38 J Soc Phil 22.
66 J Draeger, ‘Must We Care About Racial Injustice?’ (2008) 39 J Soc Phil 62.
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approach to how we privilege different commitments in action’, so as not to run
afoul of the requirement of consistency.67 According to this approach, a given
commitment may be salient in context 1, but not in context 2, where another
commitment is salient. In Brownlee’s example, a woman committed to covering
her head in public needs to go out bareheaded to get aid for her sick child; however,
only other women will see her. Since her commitment to her child’s welfare is the
most salient feature of the situation (given the child’s sickness), and insofar as ‘it is
not a core part of [her] conviction that women not see [her] bareheaded’, the
woman’s seeming lapse of consistency is a merely apparent one, and by no means
undermines her conscientious commitment to covering her head.68
Of course Brownlee recognises that such straightforward solutions are not
always available, noting in particular that although the woman’s conduct
satisfies the consistency condition in the imagined scenario, ‘[t]he more rigid,
absolute, and demanding your declared conviction is, the less easily you can
adopt a context-sensitive approach to consistency’.69 However, she does not
further explore the parameters of, and possible approaches to, practical
conflicts. In the remainder of this review article, I shall suggest that certain
forms of ambivalence, in the face of conflicts between commitments, are
particularly propitious to developing true conscience.
Ambivalence appears to stand opposed to the idea of ‘clean conscience’,
which Brownlee understands, along the lines of the Buddhist notion of ‘bliss of
blamelessness’, to designate ‘the happiness that comes from leading a life of
objective integrity as well as we can’.70 If ‘clean conscience’ refers to moral
ease, ambivalence seems rather the mark of a troubled, confused, or ‘unclean’
conscience, one whose inner conflicts undermine steadfast responsible action.
However, Amelie Rorty has recently pleaded in favour of ambivalence,
arguing that it can be epistemologically grounded and responsible, and that
constructive and collaborative resolutions of ambivalence reveal ‘how much of
our thinking—and so also how much of our motivational structure—emerges
from the details of our collaborative and dialogical engagements’.71 Rorty
conceives of ambivalence as ‘one of the costs of the latent tensions among the
competing priorities of our multiple identifications and allegiances’.72 In other
words—and consistently with Brownlee’s commitment to moral pluralism—
ambivalence is inevitable given the multiplicity of roles we inhabit. ‘We are all
(in one way or another) Methodist-Cambodian-American-entrepreneurial-
academic-Red Sox-fans-in-debt’, writes Rorty: ‘we absorb and internalize the
67 Brownlee 32.
68 ibid.
69 ibid.
70 ibid 71.
71 A Rorty, ‘The Ethics of Collaborative Ambivalence’ (2014) 18 J Ethics 391.
72 ibid 392.
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ethos of diverse modes of life whose organizing values and priorities are in
practice sometimes incompatible and incommensurable’.73
Rorty distinguishes ambivalence from indecisiveness and vacillation. When we
are indecisive about what to do, we are ‘in a maybe this/maybe that epistemic
condition, with multiple distinctively ranked preferences among their various
desirable options’.74 We vacillate when we are ‘in a now this/now that epistemic
condition that expresses erratic and shifting preferences between distinctive and
apparently incompatible options’.75 To be ambivalent is to be ‘in a both/and
epistemic and motivational condition, endorsing all one’s options while thinking
them incompatible’.76 Whereas indecision and vacillation call for stable guiding
criteria, which we can arrive at by engaging in reflective equilibrium, the best
policy in the face of ambivalence, according to Rorty, involves first trying to
identify and assess the sources and grounds of our ambivalence.
When we have reasons in favour of each alternative, so that our ambivalence
is a fitting response to our circumstances, Rorty deems our ambivalence
internally appropriate.77 If we reflectively attempt to integrate the grounds for
our appropriate ambivalence with our other commitments, we are responsibly
ambivalent.78 We can also imaginatively reframe our choice in order to preserve
the terms and rationales of both commitments, thereby exercising constructive
ambivalence.79 The best strategy for constructive ambivalence involves expand-
ing the scope of our partners in deliberation and enlisting their empathic
cooperation in a shared deliberative effort. Collaborative ambivalence, as Rorty
calls this, enables us to envision different resolutions to our conflict as well as
to deepen our understanding of ourselves and our partners through practical
and dialogic engagement with others.80
Rorty draws several conclusions from her discussion. First, the strategies of
collaborative ambivalence should be deployed to address conflicts in both the
private and public spheres.81 Second, the rich imaginative skills involved in
constructive, collaborative ambivalence should count among our civic virtues
and be fostered accordingly through education.82 Third, reflection on the ethics
of ambivalence reveals the deeply collaborative structure of our thinking, contra
‘our folk-psychological and philosophical models of thoughtful deliberation . . .
[which] treat thinking as an individualistic process’.83 I am particularly interested
in this last point and how it relates to Brownlee’s conception of conscience.
73 ibid.
74 ibid 394.
75 ibid.
76 ibid.
77 ibid 395.
78 ibid 396–97.
79 ibid 399.
80 ibid 399–402.
81 ibid 392.
82 ibid 392, 401.
83 ibid 392.
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Through education, we learn from someone else to cultivate the practical
moral skills required for true conscience; we form our convictions under the
influence of others; we learn our roles and responsibilities with others; we try to
be responsive to the needs of others; and we also continually transform
ourselves by practically engaging with others. In short, conscience is an
interactive enterprise, which we learn and undertake with others.
Brownlee’s communicative principle may seem to hint at the collaborative
nature of conscientious and conscience-animated thinking, given its requirement
to engage in dialogue with others about one’s views. But being willing to give a
reasoned defence of one’s view is not the same thing as cooperating with others to
adjust one’s view to new and complex moral situations. Brownlee later identifies
three sources in which solutions to practical dilemmas can be found—the
democratic decision-making process, the consensus of the relevant office-holders,
and a coordination principle—all of which emphasise collaborative engagement of
some sort.84 However, she finds these conflict-resolution procedures flawed and
limited and does not discuss non-institutionalised collaborative resolutions.
Upon closer reading, Conscience and Conviction may be found to construct one
of those philosophical models that treat thoughtful (conscientious and consci-
ence-driven) deliberation as an individualistic process. This is visible at various
points, starting with the book cover’s illustration from Norman Rockwell’s The
Jury, in which a woman stands firm in her conviction, alone against eleven
men85 (and yet the jury room could provide an interesting model of collaborative
ambivalence). It is also manifest when Brownlee refers to individual paragons of
conscience such as Aung San Suu Kyi86 and the Dalai Lama87 (who certainly
engage in dialogue with others, but perhaps more as teachers or mediators than
as partners in deliberation), as well as with the notion of ‘bliss of blameless-
ness’,88 which indeed can only bless a select few individuals. Brownlee’s
individualistic slant appears more generally in her discussion of the moral roles
thesis, in which she emphasises the responsibility to think for ourselves against
our peers and superiors in order to privilege our moral responsibilities before the
formal expectations of our positions when these conflict non-trivially.89
These individualistic accents inflecting Brownlee’s book together suggest that
her model of conscience misses, and should have included, the crucial insight
brought out so vividly by Rorty regarding the collaborative nature of our thinking.
Collaborative ambivalence seems like an especially fitting strategy to resolve
some of the practical conflicts facing professionals. Brownlee praises the doctors
84 Brownlee 116–17.
85 Brownlee reflects on the painting in two different passages: ibid 1–2, 11. She also discusses it at length in
her interview with Robert Talisse for New Books in Philosophy (28 May 2013) <http://newbooksinphilosophy.com/
2013/05/28/kimberley-brownlee-conscience-and-conviction-the-case-for-civil-disobedience-oxford-up-2012/> ac-
cessed 25 July 2014.
86 ibid 32, 51, 64, 71, 74, 77, 81, 85–86.
87 ibid 39, 76.
88 ibid 71.
89 ibid 87–88, 97–100.
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in California who refused to oversee capital punishment by lethal injection,
leading to a de facto moratorium on executions in the state. However,
physicians’ and anaesthesiologists’ conscientious opposition to overseeing capital
punishment does not necessarily halt executions; instead it often leads to their
performance without properly trained staff. This regularly results in patient–
inmates’ extreme and prolonged suffering at the time of death, as the recent
botched executions in Ohio, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Arkansas illustrate.90
So physicians might feel appropriately ambivalent about their role-based
responsibilities in the situation, torn between their dedication to preserving life
and their duty to alleviate patients’ suffering. Physicians appropriately and
responsibly ambivalent about what to do in cases of capital punishment would
attempt to assess the sources of their ambivalence. They would reflect on their
special moral responsibilities as healthcare providers in the particular political
context (eg given the state’s commitment to executing convicted defendants
with or without medical staff), and not just in the abstract (eg by merely
invoking the Hippocratic oath to ‘do no harm’91 or the immorality of capital
punishment92). Constructive ambivalence also calls for enlisting the whole
profession to reflect on the dilemma. The American Medical Association
(AMA) and the American Society of Anaesthesiologists (ASA), for instance,
issued official statements against physician participation in executions.93
Collaborative ambivalence may thus be crucial not only for individuals to
find a solution to the conflicts they face, but also to realising the minimum
moral burdens principle in society. According to this principle, society must
ensure as well as possible that the offices it sets up to address important
concerns do not place undue moral burdens upon any would-be occupants of
those offices.94 The results of professionals’ shared deliberation can indeed
guide society in its attempt to minimise the moral burdens that befall role-
occupants in cases of conflicts between the formal expectations of offices and
the moral responsibilities that underpin and legitimate those offices. Thus the
American Board of Anaesthesiologists (ABA) sanctions anaesthesiologists who
90 See eg G Strauss, ‘Ohio Killer’s Slow Execution Raises Controversy’ USA Today (16 January 2014) <www.
usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/16/ohio-killer-executed-with-new-lethal-drug-combo/4512651/> accessed
17 October 2014; CJ Carter and J Morris, ‘Documents: Not Enough Drugs Left to Finish Botched Oklahoma
Execution’ CNN (8 September 2014) <www.cnn.com/2014/05/01/us/oklahoma-botched-execution/> accessed 15
October 2014; ‘Botched Execution: Arizona Prisoner Takes Two Hours to Die’ The Week (24 July 2014) <www.
theweek.co.uk/us/58333/botched-execution-why-us-has-turned-untried-drugs>; M Brantley, ‘A Botched
Execution Doesn’t Appear to Stir Much Discussion in Arkansas’ The Week (5 May 2014) <www.arktimes.
com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2014/05/05/a-botched-execution-doesnt-appear-to-stir-much-discussion-in-arkansas>
accessed 17 October 2014.
91 See eg AMA, Code of Medical Ethics, ‘Opinion 2.06—Capital Punishment’ <www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion206.page?> accessed 1 October 2014.
92 See eg PJ Litton ‘Physician Participation in Executions, The Morality of Capital Punishment, and the
Practical Implications of Their Relationship’ (2013) 41 JL Med & Ethics 333.
93 AMA (n 91); ASA, ‘Statement on Physician Nonparticipation in Legally Authorized Executions’ (approved
2006, reaffirmed 2011) <www.asahq.org/For-Members//media/For%20Members/Standards%20and%20
Guidelines/2012/STATEMENT%20ON%20PHYSICIAN%20NONPARTICIPATION%20IN%20LEGALLY.
ashx> accessed 29 October 2014.
94 Brownlee 88, 100–2.
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participate in legally authorised executions by revoking their ABA
Certification.95 In so doing, the ABA seeks to eliminate one course of action
for anaesthesiologists (namely, participation) and, in effect, transfers the
dilemma onto authorities, as the latter are now caught between the Scylla of
botched executions as a result of lack of expert oversight and the Charybdis of
imposing excessive burdens on physicians by requesting, or even mandating,
their presence, as some states do.96 In these ways, collaborative ambivalence
helps redescribe the binary choice facing physicians between participating or
not participating, by transferring some of the pressure onto state authority and
initiating debates about the special moral responsibilities of healthcare
providers and what the state can legitimately ask of them.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, this review challenged Brownlee’s conceptions of the two core
concepts of the book—conscience and conviction. I first argued that Brownlee’s
understanding of conscientious conviction as necessarily communicative is too
narrow. It arbitrarily excludes core moral beliefs such as faith-based religious
beliefs, burgeoning moral commitments, and dissident political views, which
we would want to classify as convictions although they violate one or more of
the conditions of the communicative principle (insofar as they are not
consistent, evasive, universal, or dialogic). Although Brownlee responds to a
number of objections in the book, her emphasis on the communicative
principle’s context sensitivity seems to defeat the force and point of the
principle, which is to ensure that the sincerity of our commitments be clearly
visible to all. In addition, the communicative principle draws problematic lines
between beliefs that are responsive to basic evidentiary standards, and thus
satisfy the consistency requirement, and those that violate such requirement. In
lieu of equating conscientiousness and communicativeness, I proposed to keep
the two properties separate while defending the case for respecting suitably
constrained civil disobedience in virtue of its communicativeness.
Second, I argued that Brownlee’s conscience argument rests on an
incomplete account of conscience, insofar as it neglects some of the persistent
obstacles for the cultivation of conscience. I identified those obstacles produced
by structural injustice and proposed several strategies for developing conscience
against them, including vigilance, self-scrutiny, empathy, and collaborative
ambivalence. Reflection on the latter strategy further helps to perceive the
95 ABA, Primary Certification Booklet of Information, 3.06 ‘Professional Standing’ (February 2014) <www.
theaba.org/pdf/BOI.pdf> accessed 28 October 2014. As far as I can tell, no anaesthesiologist’s license has been
revoked, in part because participating doctors are generally granted anonymity.
96 Oklahoma is one of those states. See eg AMA, ‘State Mandates for Physician Participation in Capital
Punishment Violate Medical Ethics’ (2 May 2014) <http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2014/2014-
05-02-state-mandates-capital-punishment.page> accessed 29 October 2014.
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collaborative nature of both conscientious and conscience-driven thinking and
to grasp the potential of shared deliberation in cases of professional dilemmas.
My disagreements with Brownlee aside, Conscience and Conviction is an
outstanding book that any scholar working on civil disobedience, conscientious
objection, punishment, and practical reason, ought to engage with. The book’s
merits lie not only in the rich and nuanced answers it offers to important
questions, but also in its ability to raise new questions and stimulate engaging
philosophical discussion.
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